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Abstract 
Corruption is an issue of increasing visibility in the academic and policy literature on 
governance and public policy.  Whilst it is often talked about, there appears to be 
some lack of clarity on both its nature and the nature of its determinants.  This has 
led to some increase in the effort to combat it (in light of its significant costs for 
society) and it is questionable how effective these attempts have been to date. 
 
Corruption has a complex relationship with public sector reform.  Reform is often 
executed which has as one of its objectives the control of corruption, but reform itself 
may be a cause of corruption according to some evidence from recent rounds of 
economic and public sector reform. 
 
The nature of the relationship is complicated by the fundamental nature of public 
sector reform.  This is often ‘dual’ in nature, combining both destructive and 
constructive phases that redistribute the relative power of internal and external 
interest groups, create grievances, and present new opportunities for incumbents 
when compared to the pre-reform position. 
 
This paper presents an analysis of some of the data on corruption in relation to public 
sector reform, and attempts to clarify the nature of the corruption phenomenon in 
order to answer the question whether corruption can categorically be said to be a 
problem of public sector reform, or a consequence of it. 
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Introduction 
 
There exists a strong relationship between the theory of corruption and public sector 
reform.  Whilst many areas of public policy proceed without necessary reference to 
corruption, the reform of the public sector appears inextricably linked to the problem 
of corruption.  Economic bases for public sector reform now emphasise the need for 
transparent governance structure, and ‘checks and balances’ that may prevent abuse 
of any individual’s position.  Reform packages will now typically recognise some 
issues of corruption - the nature of the relationship between the two concepts, 
however, is less straightforward than is normally suggested. 
 
Corruption is arguably a costly and economically damaging problem that 
governments, particularly in developing countries, need to address as part of any 
overall pattern of reforms.  Williamson (2003) reviews the list of standard reforms of 
the ‘Washington Consensus’ of the late 1980s and 1990s that reflected the political 
position of several dominant Western governments of the time who followed 
‘monetarist’ economic doctrine.  The reforms required on this ‘shortlist’ of policies 
were:   fiscal discipline, reordering public expenditure priorities; tax reform; 
liberalization of interest rates; a competitive exchange rate; trade liberalization; 
liberalization of inward foreign direct investment; privatization; deregulation; and 
property rights (p.10).  These would, overall, reduce the extent of the involvement of 
the state in domestic and international markets, reduce the extent of its spending 
programmes, reduce its levels of employment, and reduce the ‘imperfections’ that 
prevented markets from solving fundamental economic problems such as 
unemployment or trade imbalances.  Versions of these reforms can be seen 
wherever the international financial institutions were active from the mid 1980’s (or 
even earlier) right into the late 1990s and the present day. 
 
This consensus on economic reforms paralleled another generally neoliberal 
movement of the time, the New Public Management, which sought for governments 
to enforce a clear separation of roles between political and administrative members 
of the state, and to refocus the state administration towards clear objectives of the 
government at the same as performing its tasks more efficiently.  Whilst this 
oversimplifies the movement considerably, it can be summarised as the pursuit of 
more for less, and the removal of the administration from political processes of the 
state to a large degree.  The rhetoric surrounding this movement emphasised the 
clear inefficiency of existing systems of administration where, in many countries, the 
lines between political and administrative actors was blurred.  The emphasis on 
monitoring the extent to which services were delivered and at what cost reflected a 
general view that the state could be run along economic lines, and that it should be 
as small as possible to fulfil its core functions.  It suggested that governments 
implementing these reforms would see clear benefits in terms of both cost reduction 
and improvement in the quality of services provided to the public. 
 
Many years on, now, the evidence does not appear to support the optimistic 
pronouncements of either school, partly due to the complex nature of the developed 
and less developed countries in which the theories were put into practice, and 
possibly also due to the fundamental inadequacies of the theoretical approaches that 
underpinned these reforms.  In particular, the New Public Management appears to 
have produced only limited savings that are hard to quantify, and definite costs to the 
public administration of many developing countries (Andrews and Shah, 2003).  This 
paper attempts to examine one  particular aspect that constituted a weakness in both 
sets of reforms, that of corruption and its control.  This is arguably both an economic 
policy problem (affecting the implementation of many of the ‘micro-management’ 
elements of the economic reform programmes suggested) and public administration 
problem, as well as having demonstrable negative effects on the economies of those 
countries afflicted with the problem.  The paper takes the approach of examining the 
connections between different sets of reform and corruption using a review of 
corruption theory to analyse the likely outcomes of such programmes.  In reviewing 
the evidence of ‘completed’ reform programmes executed in the former-socialist 
states in Central and Eastern Europe, in particular, it demonstrates the long-term 
changes in levels of corruption that follow economic and public-administrative reform 
programmes of the types referred to above.  In practice, both sets of reforms were 
simultaneously introduced in the process of post-socialist transition, and the effects 
of ‘standard reforms’ can therefore be considered in a way, although the examination 
of particular elements is of course not possibly due to the simultaneity of the effects 
on the economic system. 
 
Public Sector Reform 
The creation of packages of reforms for the public sector appears, strangely, to have 
been a largely theoretical exercise in many respects.  Elements of the theory of 
economic governance and motivation theory have obvious implications for the reform 
of administrative structures, and make it possible to predict the likely reactions of 
individuals caught up in these programmes.  It is strange, however, that little attention 
was paid to the possible differences between developed and less-developed 
countries, and how this might affect the suitability of particular reform packages.  It 
would appear logical to analyse the differences in the problems experiences by 
different types of countries before suggesting the solutions, in the form of a reform 
package, but this appears not to have happened to any significant extent.  Rather 
there has been a set of pragmatic responses amongst those attempting to implement 
policies, resulting in a divergence, to some extent, between the developed and less-
developed forms of the public sector reforms.  Arguably this may have been a useful 
strategy to apply in the implementation of the economic reform strategies of the 
period which were generally very uniform in their imposition.  The ‘particularism’ of 
the reform strategies may potentially have increased their effectiveness in particular 
countries, but also makes a scientific comparison almost impossible. 
 
1. Developed countries? 
The standard set of policy reforms aimed, in developed countries, to trim the size of 
‘over-large’ states and make them more fit for purpose, according to the general 
approach of the New Public Management.  This involved a refocusing on separation 
of political and administrative responsibilities; on policy objectives; on roles; on 
structures; and on performance and its monitoring.  This, pushed by the common 
neoliberal agenda of the 1980s and 1990s has not yet been sufficiently examined in 
terms of the impact on the relationship between the political and administrative state, 
and the impact on the political activity internal to the administration. 
 
Typically, the policies in ‘Westminster model’ countries (where the British system of 
government had been imposed or influential at some point in history) encouraged the 
exaggeration of the existing separation of powers in those countries.  This move 
towards a more ‘professional’ civil service, rather than a more political one, would 
help clarify roles and focus efforts on the official goals of the administration.  This has 
met with problems, however, for a number of reasons.  The considerable autonomy 
of political ‘masters’ means that some moves have been made to redistribute power 
back to the administrators due to the potential for new governments to reverse 
previous benefits of the outgoing party after an election loss.  This argument shows 
through in transition states keen to imitate Western political models, such as the 
political changes of the presidential system in Russia with both a strong president 
enabling strong-state promotion of reform; but also a constitution with high costs of 
adjustment to help fix the reforms and make flip-flopping difficult.  President Yeltsin 
showed, however, that no system is proof against reversal of beneficial policies, 
when the political situation is complex and unstable or at least frequently shifting.  
Thatcherism and the reform of the public sector in US, Australia, and Norway, and to 
some extent recent reforms in Finland, are other significant cases of this tendency.  
Initial stages focussed on service delivery and the execution and implementation of 
the policy choice of politicians.   
 
Later developments in some countries suggest a move away from Woodrow Wilson’s 
separation of politics and administration – possibly due to this problem. There is for 
instance significant use in the UK of ‘special advisers’ that are ‘extra-establishment’, 
and political appointments.  This reflects research on the nature of individuals 
involved in public administration in some developed economies.  This research 
suggests that two types of administrator co-exist, classical or those expecting 
separation of duties along ‘classical’ lines, and political, or those expecting more 
active involvement in the forms of implementation and effectively ‘politics on the 
ground’ operate in modern administrations.  When examining the detail of many 
countries that have in principle implemented reform of the public administration, it is 
often obvious significant exceptions exist.  
 
Overall, a debate exists, still, over the effectiveness of the separation of political and 
administrative functions as it can be argued that reducing the autonomy of public 
administrators restricts their ability to act rapidly and therefore efficiently.  This 
suggests the need for ‘light touch’ streamlined regulation and controls.  The 
accountability agenda, however, calls for increased monitoring (and therefore also 
‘voluntary’ reporting to create auditable information on the work of the administration) 
and public scrutiny, which may lead to increased interventions from political masters 
into the administrative process, as the politician is motivated by the need to mollify 
the public concerns.  Thus the reform programme attempts to pursue conflicting 
goals simultaneously, which results in difficulties for the administration. 
 
2. Developing countries?   
The obvious question arises when considering the use of standard reform packages 
in developing countries, does the problem fit the solution?  Andrews and Shah (2003) 
identify a range of weaknesses in the public administration of developing countries.  
These range from the purely economic to the largely social in nature, reflecting the 
complexity of the process of reform of developing countries (Table 1) 
 
Table 1: Common Governance and Administrative Weakness in Developing 
Countries 
 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
 
Reforms are sometimes internally motivated as countries address the problem of 
achieving difficult targets in terms of service provision and often important elements 
of economic development from highly restricted resources.  The external influence 
often shows itself in the need to demonstrate particular attributes that will for instance 
satisfy external donors, or perhaps alter the positioning of the state in the opinions of 
influential powers.  The ‘trickledown’ of the neoliberal NPM policies into developing 
countries is demonstrated in a range of studies.  Unfortunately the higher degree of 
resource scarcity increases the difficulties of implementation of any of the policies 
enormously. 
 
The general elements of the reform strategies have been divided into four main areas 
in the work of the UNDP:  
 ‘(i) Civil service reform, which is concerned with human resources in the public 
sector such as capacity, wages and conditions. 
 (ii) Increasing the efficiency and responsiveness of the policy-making system. 
 (iii) Reforming the machinery of government, which is concerned with the rules, 
institutions, and structure of the administration necessary to carry out 
government policy, including new tools for public administration, notably e-
governance and e-government.  
 (iv) Reforming the public sector revenue and expenditure management system.’ 
(UNDP, 2004, p.6) 
 
Given the points considered above, some distinct elements of reform can be 
identified for developing countries.  Typical Public Administration Reform elements 
for Commonwealth countries have been identified by Kaul (1997).  Miller (2005) 
summarises these as: 
1. redefinition of the political and administrative interface:  clarify the roles 
between political policy makers and administrative policy implementers – 
‘distinguish between strategic objectives and operational processes’ (p.22); 
2. selection of appropriate reform options (from both private sector and 
international experience); 
3. raising accountability (government or donor led initiative) – ‘performance 
measurement, devolution or resource control, improving monitoring and 
evaluation techniques, clarifying incentives and aligning functions with 
strategic objectives’ (p.22); 
4. initiating public-private sector partnerships; 
5. efficiency:  ‘emphasis… placed on the public service to achieve 
developmental priorities.’ (p.22); 
6. audit of staff cost and skills; 
7. anti-corruption initiatives; 
8. change, fundamentally,  public sector values. 
(adapted from Miller, 2005, p.22) 
 
The UNDP Governance project has encouraged the reform of public sectors to 
pursue both political and economic/administrative aims for many years.  In their 
review of best practice in the field of public sector administration, they come to two 
strong conclusions.  Firstly, the nature of the developing economy makes a 
significant difference to the nature of appropriate policies, with a powerful and ‘over-
large’ state being a necessity rather than a burden.  In many cases it needs to 
substitute for the absent or under-developed private economy:  ‘In the LDCs and post 
conflict countries in particular, underdeveloped private sectors require the public 
administration to play a major role in the delivery of services’ (UNDP, 2004, p.3).  
Secondly, the nature of the state is not simple, and it appears unlikely that a clear 
separation of duties can be effective, with administrators performing specific goal-
oriented processes and politicians setting strategy.  This over-simplifies the role and 
character of both administrative and political actors in developing countries.  In 
particular, public sector management also involves:  ‘fostering dynamic partnerships 
with the civil society and the private sector, to improve the quality of service delivery, 
enhance social responsibilities and ensure the broad participation of citizens in 
decision-making and feedback on public service performance.’ (UNDP, 2004, p.3)  
This explains the contradiction between the objective of minimising state involvement 
in the economy and increasing focus on specific administrative functions, whilst also 
suggesting the use of private-public partnerships.   
 
Overall, the situation is still unclear whether the New Public Management approach 
was effective or not in helping to achieve its goals.  Moreover, it remains unclear 
what the wider impacts are on the operation of governments.  As Peters and Pierre 
(2001b) state:  ‘administrative reform has … had a profound impact on the nature of 
politics within the public sector, and especially on the relationship between civil 
servants and their nominal political masters’ (pp.1-2).  What that impact is, exactly, 
remains unclear. 
 
Corruption theory 
Some confusion exists between the different approaches to corruption, relating to the 
exact nature of corrupt administrators.  The question is, are they ‘bad’, or ‘mad’?  The 
relationship between the administrator that ‘chooses’ to be corrupt and the state in 
which they operate is relevant to this problem, obviously, but this is often neglected 
from some theoretical approaches.  Alternatively the relationship between the 
administrator and the ‘clients’ that they deal with may similarly be significant in the 
explanation of the corrupt act.  Many of the deviations from expected behaviour in the 
‘principal-agent’ relationship between the state and individual administrators may be 
interpreted as corruption.  Some corruption definitions stretch to over forty types of 
corruption, but even simple models are relatively complex (Figure 1). 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
Broadly speaking, the economic approach to corruption, which is possibly the 
dominant one, would discount relationship factors in favour of explanations based in 
the calculation of self-interested strategies, given the incentives which surround 
individual administrators.  This is clearly assuming that the administrator is ‘bad’.  
People are selfish unless incentives are created to keep them honest – a simple 
extension of the standard economic assumption that individuals are selfish, 
calculating optimisers.  In this sense everyone, not just administrators, might be 
assumed to be ‘bad’.  Alternatively, it can be assumed that individual administrators 
are inherently good, but are turned by environmental factors or group decision 
making into someone ‘bad’ – this is an explanation of ‘bad, but understandably so’.  
Gorta (1998) sees this tendency in some of the sociologically based criminology 
literature as of potential value in combating corruption, in the case of Australian 
public administration following its implementation of the New Public Management 
approach.  Finally, they may be categorised as ‘mad’.  This would either involve non-
calculating corruption that does not benefit the individual (the closest an economic 
approach may come to a definition of irrationality) or it may be seen as ‘annoyance’ 
or loss of reason.  The literature on fraud uses ‘fraud triangle’ (Figure 1) based on 
Cressey’s (1953) research into the motivation of offenders to explain the decision to 
perpetrate a fraud, and this may be similarly applied to corrupt acts.  In Cressey’s 
model, the act of the crime depends on the existence of a motive, an opportunity (to 
commit crime and potentially get away with it), and ‘rationalisation’.  Individuals who 
are de-motivated or hold some grievance may be tipped over from being honest to 
dishonest by the existence of this third factor, which reduces the reluctance to harm 
ones victim. 
 
Figure 2:  The Fraud Triangle 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
The implications of these models for public administration reform can be briefly 
sketched out if we consider the position of individual administrators and compare this 
to the ‘decision factors’ used in each of the approaches. 
 
Firstly, the economic approach is quite simple to apply to the case of administrative 
reform, and Stiglitz (2002) examines just such a case from a developing country.  
Faced with the changing administrative structures and, in particular, with the 
reduction in the scope of activity of an individual administrator in the process of ‘re-
focussing’, there exists a strong incentive for individuals to take some benefits while 
the opportunity still exists.  In transition countries this resulted in the phenomena of 
‘insider privatisation’, where state officials took control of and, effectively, plundered 
many state owned operation before they could be privatised in order to strip some 
benefits out of the system.  Often the ability to do this with relative impunity existed 
due to the closed nature of the state administration and the strong networks between 
branches of administration and legal institutions.  Similarly, Stiglitz cites examples of 
administrators used to taking small occasional bribes (minor corruption) from state 
service provision who, faced with their privatisation, decide to compensate 
themselves with one-off windfalls through acts of major corruption. 
 
Figure 3:  Impact of post-socialist reform on corruption scores (CPI) 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
In both of the above examples, there would be a severe deterioration in corruption in 
a country experiencing particular types of reform (specifically relating to economic 
reform, but more generally to any reform where public administrators could derive an 
income, if inclined to do so, pre-reform).  These short-term effects would be severe, 
but shortlived on the face of it.  Experience of corruption has shown, however, that 
the growth of crime such as corruption is a ‘ratchet effect’ which is easier to raise 
than to lower.  The growth of corrupt practices has a range of knock-on effects in the 
economy that are likely to reinforce the tendency to corruption.  Whilst many models 
of corruption exist, a strong and significant correlation exists between levels of 
income and corruption.  This may account for the distinct and prolonged decline in 
the corruption scores of those transition countries for whom historical data exists. 
 
This characteristic behaviour, in terms of the corruption performance, of post-socialist 
reformers is potentially of significant concern for those considering the 
implementation of public administration reform.  The evidence suggests that 
corruption both deteriorates and then stagnates for a significant period, with many of 
these countries experiencing a decline for the best part of the following decade.   
 
At the most basic level, higher incomes are likely to reduce the need for further 
income (Figures 4 & 5; also Ehrlich & Lui, 1999).  Relating this to the fraud model, 
higher income is likely to reduce the dissatisfaction of individuals and so reduce the 
potential ‘rationalisation’ of the act.  Accordingly, this can be seen as evidence in 
support of the fraud approach to corruption. 
 
Figure 4:  Relationship between corruption control and income levels 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
Figure 5:  Relationship between legal corruption control and income levels 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
This correlation is not sufficient explanation, however, of the phenomenon of 
corruption.  Whilst income is a strong determinant of corruption, the evidence from 
non-OECD countries is much less conclusive showing wide variation that is not 
explained by income levels.  Factors such as culture have been cited as potential 
explanations for these differences, as well as social and political institutions.  In this 
respect, many of the international donor agencies are keen to use elements of each 
of the models in turn.  Cultural change or use of ‘social’ discouragement are key to 
some anti-corruption strategies (Gorta, 1998) whilst the general approach of the New 
Public Management, with its emphasis on transparency of administration supports 
the economic view, which would conclude that the increased chances of being 
caught in a corrupt act should significantly discourage potentially corrupt officials. 
 
Figure 6:  USAID Determinants of Corruption 
 
[Figure 6 about here] 
 
The related models for dealing with corruption similarly attempt to incorporate all the 
elements of the theoretical perspectives reviewed above.  Public sector reform is 
central to the anti-corruption strategy used by the World Bank, which is perhaps the 
most developed of those used amongst the International Financial Institutions.  The 
institutional structure that results from political and administrative structures may act 
to either discourage or encourage corrupt practices, and only a comprehensive 
strategy to deal with the many incentives to corrupt activity and patterns of corruption. 
 
Figure 7:  Multi-pronged strategy for state capture and administrative corruption 
 
[Figure 7 about here] 
 
In truth, the need to marshall a range of resources to the anti-corruption programme 
means that it is in many ways an all-encompassing concept.  Public sector reform 
and changing levels of corruption are likely to have many determinants in common.  
An active civil society is likely to reduce corruption due to its ability to give voice to 
those victims of corruption that would otherwise be powerless to complain.  It is also 
likely to increase the moves toward an open and responsive public sector.  In this 
way we would expect in many cases lower levels of corruption to be associated with 
administrative reform programmes.  In view of the evidence to the contrary from the 
transition cases, this needs further examination. 
 
In practice, a factor which is frequently significant in the introduction of public sector 
reform is the existence of external factors such as aid donor pressure that encourage 
the adoption of reform.  In this way, developing countries may easily demonstrate 
such contradictory evidence.  The lack of domestic pressures to reform may suggest, 
however, that an absence of civil society pressure exists that may create a vacuum in 
the post-reform system.  This may firstly undermine the ability of individuals to take 
advantage of nominal transparency in the administrative systems, and secondly the 
reforms may create incentives to corrupt practices amongst officials without the 
‘countervailing power’ of an active civil society that might otherwise have mitigated 
the excesses of corrupt officials. 
 
Conclusion 
Corruption has a complex relationship with public sector reform.  Reform is often 
executed which has as one of its objectives the control of corruption, but reform itself 
may be a cause of corruption according to some evidence from recent rounds of 
economic and public sector reform. 
 
The nature of the relationship is complicated by the fundamental nature of public 
sector reform.  This is often ‘dual’ in nature, combining both destructive and 
constructive phases that redistribute the relative power of internal and external 
interest groups, create grievances, and present new opportunities for incumbents 
when compared to the pre-reform position. 
 
Overall, the outcome of a ‘New Public Management’ style reform programme is, on 
the basis of the evidence presented above, impossible to judge.  This stems from 
differences in the nature of the economic or political system in which reform takes 
place; the differences in social and cultural institutions; and the varying levels of 
development of necessary supporting institutions that might support the effectiveness 
of the reform programme.  It is however likely that reforms may create incentives to 
corruption that, unless checked, can cause significant and prolonged problems with 
corruption that may undermine the benefits of the administrative reform.  Whilst New 
Public Management appears to demonstrate only limited benefits, the consequential 
corruption appears on the basis of statistical evidence likely to have significant 
negative economic impacts.  This brings into question the advisability of such 
programmes without some sensitivity to the particular situation of the countries in 
which the reforms are implemented. 
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Table 1: Common Governance & Administrative Weakness in Developing Countries 
 
Low capacity: Low personnel capacity 
  Low systems capacity 
    
Organizational centralization and top-down 
governance: Process orientation 
  Permanence and non-innovation 
    
Service monopolies: 
Uncompetitive and unaccountable 
public production processes 
 
Weak incentives for production 
efficiency 
    
‘Social insulation’, low transparency and 
poor participation: 
Social exclusion based on process 
and ‘normal professionalism’ 
  
Internally biased, non-responsive 
incentive structures 
    
Poor organizational evaluation and 
accountability mechanisms: 
Weak internal evaluation 
mechanisms 
  
Few external (social) evaluation 
mechanisms 
  
Source:  Andrews and Shah (2003) p.6.4 
 
Table 2:  Public Expenditure Tracking Surveys:  Capture of non-wage funds in 
primary education 
Country Year Expenditure programme Sample size Capture (% of 
non-wage 
budget) 
Ghana 1998 Non-wage spending in 
primary education (multiple 
programmes) 
126 49 
Peru 2001 Utilities 100 30 
Tanzania 1998 Non-wage spending in 
primary education (multiple 
programmes) 
45 57 
Uganda 1995 Per-student capitation grant 250 78 
Zambia 2001 Fixed school grant 182 10 
Zambia 2001 Discretionary non-wage 
grant programme 
182 76 
Source: Reinikka & Smith (2004), table 2.1, p.36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Forms of Corruption 
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Figure 3:  Impact of post-socialist reform on corruption scores (CPI) 
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Figure 4:  Relationship between corruption control and income levels 
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Figure 5:  Relationship between legal corruption control and income levels 
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Figure 6:  USAID Determinants of Corruption 
Source:  USAID (2005) p.15 
 
Figure 7:  Multi-pronged strategy for state capture and administrative corruption 
 
 
Source World Bank (2000), p.xxii 
 
Missing from this (following page) – fostering an independent media. 
 
 
 
 
 
